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A MOMENT'S INADVERTENCE 
SHOULD NOT BRING DOWN THE 
HEAVENS: RETHINKING 
PROPORTIONALITY IN NEGLIGENCE 
LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
Karan Venter* 
True proportionality between the degree of a tortfeasor's fault and the extent of a plaintiff's loss is 
unachievable in negligence law in New Zealand. As Mallon J's judgment in Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd 
v Attorney-General highlighted, the concept of proportionality can only be used to negate an alleged 
tortfeasor's duty of care, thereby eliminating the potential for liability. This approach does not 
accommodate differing levels of disproportionality. Moreover, relying on negligence law's liability 
limiting mechanisms to achieve proportionality, as Mallon J did in Strathboss, will not always be 
fruitful; there may still be a large gap between what a defendant has done and what the defendant is 
held accountable for. The extent of a tortfeasor's liability may depend on luck rather than principle. 
However, internationally, the wrongful conception and birth cases reveal a more nuanced use of 
proportionality: reducing the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care. While this may be seen as 
inconsistent with negligence law's compensatory objective, I argue that a tortfeasor's interest in being 
free from undue burdens should constrain this objective, where necessary. This article develops on 
the reasoning in the wrongful conception and birth cases and borrows from the language of the 
Contributory Negligence Act 1947 to create a general mechanism for limiting a tortfeasor's liability 
in the interests of proportionality. The proposed mechanism aims to ensure that the law of negligence 
delivers more just results.  
  
*  Submitted for the LLB (Honours) Degree, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, 2019. At the 
time of submission, the Court of Appeal had not released its judgment in Attorney-General v Strathboss 
Kiwifruit Ltd [2020] NZCA 98. References to the Court of Appeal's judgment have been incorporated where 
suitable. However, the Court of Appeal's judgment does not affect the substance of this article, which is about 
how to fill the lacuna in negligence law's liability limiting mechanisms that Mallon J's judgment in Strathboss 
Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2018] NZHC 1559 highlighted. I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, 
Professor Bill Atkin, for his ongoing support and guidance. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In 1967, the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
recommended abolishing the negligence action for personal injuries.1 One reason for this 
recommendation was negligence law's tolerance for moral luck: "[r]eprehensible conduct can be 
followed by feather blows while a moment's inadvertence could call down the heavens."2 This article 
addresses the latter scenario, through the lens of proportionality. 
Proportionality is a "relational concept";3 it requires a reasonable balance between two actions. 
Moral concerns dictate the right balance.4 In criminal law, these concerns range from the belief that 
the use of force in self-defence should be proportionate to the threat faced, to the idea that punishment 
should reflect the severity of an offence.5 In the context of negligence law, proportionality should 
require a "reasonable relationship"6 between the degree of a tortfeasor's fault and the extent of their 
liability. However, Mallon J's judgment in Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General illustrates that 
proportionality is underdeveloped in negligence law in New Zealand.7 
This article has four substantive parts. Part II discusses how Mallon J used the concept of 
proportionality in her duty of care analysis in Strathboss. This analysis reveals that true proportionality 
is unachievable in negligence law because: (a) proportionality can only be used to negate an alleged 
tortfeasor's duty of care; and (b) negligence law's liability limiting mechanisms do not always 
effectively limit a tortfeasor's liability. It also considers the Court of Appeal's brief discussion of 
proportionality in Attorney-General v Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd.8 Part III examines how overseas 
courts have used proportionality to limit doctors' liability in the wrongful conception and birth cases. 
It also finds that proportionality should be a constraint on negligence law's "pursuit" of compensation.9 
Part IV proposes a new liability limiting mechanism in negligence law. This mechanism, which 
develops on the wrongful conception and birth cases and the approach of courts in assessing 
  
1  Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government 
Printer, December 1967) at [85]. This recommendation was followed: see s 317(1) of the Accident 
Compensation Act 2001.   
2  At [85]. 
3  George Letsas "Proportionality as Fittingness: The Moral Dimension of Proportionality" (2018) 71 CLP 53 
at 55. 
4  At 55. 
5  At 55. 
6  McFarlane v Tayside District Health Board [2002] 2 AC 59 (HL) at 106 per Lord Clyde. 
7  Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2018] NZHC 1559 [Strathboss (HC)] at [843]. 
8  Attorney-General v Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd [2020] NZCA 98 [Strathboss (CA)]. 
9  John CP Goldberg "Ten Half-Truths about Tort Law" (2008) 42 Val U L Rev 1221 at 1251. 
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contributory negligence claims, allows courts to reduce the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care in the 
interests of proportionality, thereby limiting their liability. Finally, Part V outlines the factors courts 
must consider in evaluating proportionality: the degree of a tortfeasor's fault and the extent of a 
plaintiff's recoverable loss. It will also overcome a common objection to the use of proportionality in 
negligence law by showing that there are degrees of negligence, both in fact and in law.  
II STRATHBOSS KIWIFRUIT LTD V ATTORNEY-GENERAL 
In November 2010 the Psa3 bacteria, known to be harmful to kiwifruit vines, was detected in New 
Zealand. The bacteria rapidly spread throughout kiwifruit orchards, causing severe damage and 
devastating the kiwifruit industry. It was thought that the bacteria arrived on a consignment of 
kiwifruit pollen shipped to Kiwi Pollen's premises in Te Puke, pursuant to an import permit granted 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF).10 A class of orchardists and Seeka, a post-harvest 
operator, sued MAF for hundreds of millions of dollars, alleging negligence under the Biosecurity 
Act 1993. 
In a stage one decision in the High Court Mallon J held that MAF negligently performed its 
statutory functions.11 MAF made various "process errors" in granting Kiwi Pollen an import permit.12 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned Mallon J's decision, finding that the Crown "has a statutory 
immunity precluding liability for the alleged negligent acts or omissions".13 The Court went further, 
holding that even if the immunity question has been answered in the orchardists' favour, it would have 
held that the Crown did not owe the orchardists a duty of care.14 The risk of indeterminate liability 
was an important policy factor in this finding.15 The Court of Appeal's discussion of proportionality, 
comprising three paragraphs,16 does not affect the substance of this article, which is about how to fill 
the lacuna in negligence law's liability limiting mechanisms that Mallon J's judgment highlighted. 
Returning to the High Court judgment, it is necessary to set out how Mallon J approached the duty 
of care question in order to see how her Honour used the concept of proportionality. Mallon J 
employed the fluid North Shore City Council v Attorney-General (The Grange) methodology in 
holding that MAF owed the orchardists (with property rights in vines) a duty to take reasonable skill 
  
10  Now the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI). 
11  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, at [843]. 
12  At [33] and [13]–[19]. 
13  Strathboss (CA), above n 8, at [6].  
14  At [7(a)] and [7(c)]. 
15  At [260].  
16  At [261]–[263]. 
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and care in its actions before the Psa3 incursion.17 The Grange methodology divides the duty question 
into two stages. The first involves considering foreseeability and proximity, factors concerned "with 
everything bearing upon the relationship between the parties".18 Mallon J held that the loss suffered 
by the orchardists was foreseeable and that the relationship between the parties was sufficiently 
proximate.19 The second stage requires courts to evaluate whether any policy factors militate against 
the imposition of a duty of care; in other words, whether it is "fair, just and reasonable to impose a 
duty".20 Mallon J found that no policy features – including proportionality – sufficiently displaced the 
orchardists' compensatory interest.21 
A The Proportionality Analysis  
MAF argued that the alleged breaches of its duty of care were not of sufficient magnitude to mean 
that it was morally responsible for the loss caused by the Psa3 incursion.22 Mallon J rejected this 
argument. She began her analysis by referring to examples of disproportionality, one being a 
misplaced match leading to extensive loss.23 Leaving aside the aptness of this as an example of 
disproportionality, the message Mallon J intended to convey is unclear. She may have been observing 
that concerns about proportionality are commonplace or expressing the view that proportionality 
should not play a role in negligence law. If the latter is true, this is contrary to Invercargill City Council 
v Southland Indoor Leisure Centre Charitable Trust24 and Minister of Education v Econicorp 
Holdings Ltd.25 
The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's disproportionality argument was not "a significant 
additional factor".26 
  
17  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, at [13], [23] and [223]–[225]. See North Shore City Council v Attorney-General 
[2012] NZSC 49, [2012] 3 NZLR 341 [The Grange]; and Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] 
AC 728 (HL) at 752.  
18  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, above n 11, at [224]; and Stephen Todd "Negligence: The Duty of Care" in Todd 
on Torts (8th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2019) 147 at 157. 
19  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, at [348] and [434]. 
20  At [225].  
21  At [480] and [497]. 
22  At [471]. 
23  At [472]. 
24  Invercargill City Council v Southland Indoor Leisure Centre Charitable Trust [2017] NZCA 68, [2017] 2 
NZLR 650 [Invercargill City Council (CA)]. 
25  Minister of Education v Econicorp Holdings Ltd [2011] NZCA 450, [2012] 1 NZLR 36. 
26  Strathboss (CA), above n 8, at [261]. 
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1 Proportionality in New Zealand case law  
Courts and scholars often refer to South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security 
Consultants & Investigations Ltd when considering proportionality.27 That case concerned whether a 
private investigator owed an insured party a duty of care. In the Court of Appeal, Richardson J (as he 
then was) held that the relationship between the plaintiff and investigator was sufficiently proximate, 
in part because the imposition of a duty of care would not expose the investigator to a burden "out of 
proportion to his moral culpability".28 However, Richardson J was not balancing the tortfeasor's fault 
with the financial burden of liability. Instead, he was weighing the tortfeasor's fault against the action-
based burden of liability. Essentially, his Honour was satisfied that the imposition of liability would 
not expose the investigator to a duty to take excessive precautions against the risk of causing loss.29 
South Pacific Manufacturing has limited utility in the present context. 
However, in Invercargill City Council, a majority of the Court of Appeal considered whether 
imposing liability would "create disproportion between the defendant's carelessness and the actual 
form of loss suffered by the plaintiff".30 The majority held that the Council, which allegedly had 
negligently issued a code compliance certificate, did not owe the Southland Leisure Centre a duty of 
care.31 The required proximity could not be established, in part because imposing liability would have 
created disproportionality between the Council's fault and the Centre's loss, which was over NZD 
16,000,000.32  
Mallon J placed little weight on Invercargill City Council because the Supreme Court reversed 
the Court of Appeal decision, expressing, according to Mallon J, "no concern about 
disproportionality".33 However, a majority of the Supreme Court reduced the Council's liability by 50 
per cent owing to the Centre's contributory negligence.34 It was appropriate for the Court to be 
unconcerned with proportionality: the Council's liability was halved, which addressed the 
  
27  See South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 
NZLR 282 (CA). See for example Invercargill City Council (CA), above n 24, at n 167; and Todd 
"Negligence: The Duty of Care", above n 18, at 161–162. 
28  Todd "Negligence: The Duty of Care", above n 18, at 307.  
29  At 307.  
30  Invercargill City Council (CA), above n 24, at [193] (emphasis added), as quoted in The Grange, above n 17, 
at [159]. 
31  Invercargill City Council (CA), above n 24, at [198]. 
32  At [194]. 
33  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, at [472]. See Southland Indoor Leisure Centre Charitable Trust v Invercargill 
City Council [2017] NZSC 190, [2018] 1 NZLR 278 [Invercargill City Council (SC)]. 
34  Invercargill City Council (SC), above n 33, at [114]. 
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disproportionality between the Council's fault and its prima facie liability. The Court of Appeal's 
discussion of proportionality is still persuasive. 
In Econicorp Holdings Ltd, a Court of Appeal majority quashed an order striking out the Minister 
of Education's claim in negligence and contract.35 Arnold J held that two policy features justified 
holding that the tortfeasor arguably owed the plaintiff a duty of care.36 One was that recognising a 
duty of care did not "create a liability which … [was] disproportionate to any wrongdoing".37 
More recently, in Smith v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd, the plaintiff sought a declaration that 
the defendants had unlawfully caused or contributed to greenhouse gas emissions in New Zealand.38 
Wylie J, in striking out the plaintiff's negligence claim, held that "[i]f the alleged duty exists, the 
defendants could be subject to disproportionate liability".39 This was slightly odd, given that the 
plaintiff did not seek damages.40 This article does not address whether the proposed framework 
applies in situations where one is seeking a declaration or an injunction.  
Invercargill City Council and Econicorp Holdings Ltd shows the Court of Appeal in two instances 
grappling with whether imposing liability on an alleged tortfeasor would strike the right balance 
between their fault and a plaintiff's loss. However, the Courts' approach to this issue was inflexible: 
proportionality could only contribute to negating a duty of care. Essentially, in New Zealand, if an 
alleged tortfeasor's fault is sufficiently disproportionate to a plaintiff's loss, courts may consider this 
in finding that either proximity is not established, or that a duty of care should not be recognised in 
the interests of sound policy. Under this approach, courts can only achieve proportionality in situations 
where an alleged tortfeasor's fault is egregiously disproportionate to a plaintiff's loss because it does 
not allow a tortfeasor's liability to be limited. At best, a court could use proportionality to justify 
holding that a duty of care was not owed to a class of individuals, therefore, limiting a tortfeasor's 
liability.  
2 Proportionality in overseas case law  
Internationally, courts have also tended to use proportionality in a similarly inflexible way. In 
Regent Holdings Pty Ltd v State of Victoria, Beach JA, in the Supreme Court of Victoria, held that 
the State of Victoria did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care to prevent damage caused by an "infectious 
herpes-like virus", in part to avoid disproportion between its fault and the plaintiff's loss, which was 
  
35  Econicorp Holdings Ltd, above n 25. 
36  At [54]–[55]. 
37  At [55]. 
38  Smith v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2020] NZHC 419. 
39  At [94]. 
40   At [95]. 
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AUD 8,200,000.41 Furthermore, in Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords, the High 
Court of Australia held that auditors did not owe a duty of care to a financier who had relied on their 
negligent audits.42 McHugh J suggested that this avoided imposing a financial burden on the auditors 
out of proportion to their fault.43 Lastly, in McLoughlin v O'Brian, the House of Lords held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for the psychiatric harm she had suffered due to the 
tortfeasor's negligence.44 However, Lord Wilberforce developed a three-stage test for determining to 
whom a tortfeasor owes a duty of care in cases involving psychiatric harm.45 His Lordship did so, in 
part, to ensure that, in future cases, any liability imposed on a tortfeasor for psychiatric harm was not 
disproportionate to their fault.46  
3 Negligence law's liability limiting mechanisms  
In the High Court, Mallon J found that, in principle, negligence law's liability limiting mechanisms 
operate as a sieve, filtering out the potential for courts to place excessive financial burdens on 
tortfeasors.47 On the facts of Strathboss, her Honour held that MAF would not be liable for the 
complete economic consequences of the incursion because it did not owe Seeka a duty of care.48 
Moreover, MAF held insurance policies that partially indemnified it from the loss claimed.49 In 
situations where an alleged tortfeasor is not insured, the potential for disproportionality is increased 
because all recoverable losses will fall directly on that tortfeasor.  
If the orchardists are successful on appeal in the Supreme Court,50 it is not necessarily axiomatic 
that any liability imposed on MAF would be proportionate to its fault. The extent of the orchardists' 
recoverable loss may be disproportionate to MAF's negligence. This outcome is made more probable 
by the fact that the liability limiting mechanisms available to MAF – causation, remoteness, 
contribution and contributory negligence – cannot be used to materially limit MAF's liability. These 
liability limiting mechanisms will be discussed in the following paragraphs.   
  
41  Regent Holdings Pty Ltd v State of Victoria [2013] VSC 601 at [1] and [225]. 
42  Esanda Finance Corp Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241 at 246. 
43  At 289. 
44  McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 (HL). 
45  At 421. 
46  At 421. 
47  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, at [464]–[467], [470] and [496(a)]. 
48  At [262], [470], [474] and [498]. 
49  At [474]. 
50  The orchardists have "vowed" to appeal to the Supreme Court: see Eric Frykberg "Kiwifruit growers' PSA 
case: Government cleared of liability" (10 April 2020) Radio New Zealand <www.rnz.co.nz>. 
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First, s 3(1) of the Contributory Negligence Act 1947 allows courts to reduce a tortfeasor's liability 
if the plaintiff, in part, contributed to the loss they incurred.51 There is no suggestion in the High Court 
and Court of Appeal judgments that the orchardists contributed to their losses. Secondly, New Zealand 
operates under a joint and several liability model concerning the liability of multiple tortfeasors.52 
Each tortfeasor is liable for the whole of the plaintiff's loss.53 However, s 17(1)(c) of the Law Reform 
Act 1936 allows tortfeasors to seek a contribution from a tortfeasor "who is, or would if sued … have 
been … liable in respect of the same damage".54 There is no indication in the High Court and Court 
of Appeal judgments that any other party was responsible for the orchardists' loss.  
Next, for loss to be recoverable in negligence law, a tortfeasor's breach needs to be the cause in 
fact, and in law, of that loss.55 Mallon J held that MAF's breach in fact caused the Psa3 incursion 
because it was more likely than not that the Kiwi Pollen consignment contained Psa3.56 The Court of 
Appeal agreed.57 If the Supreme Court overturns the Court of Appeal decision, it is likely that the 
case would be reverted to the High Court to determine, at a stage two hearing, whether MAF's breach 
in fact caused each orchardist's loss and whether MAF caused that loss in law. However, while nature 
assisted in spreading the bacteria, there was likely no intervening event that broke the chain of 
causation which would justify holding that MAF did not cause some of the loss in law.  
Another liability limiting mechanism, the remoteness inquiry, which would likewise take place at 
a stage two hearing, empowers courts to limit a tortfeasor's liability in order to avoid rendering a 
tortfeasor "liable for consequences out of all proportion to the degree of wrongdoing involved".58 A 
tortfeasor is liable only for the kind of loss caused that a reasonable person would have foreseen 
occurring.59 This reasonable person is not required to foresee the extent of loss caused.60 The 
  
51  See John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9th ed, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1998) at 302 (this was the 
last edition of The Law of Torts written by John G Fleming); and Stephen Todd "Breach of Statutory Duty" 
in Todd on Torts (8th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2019) 443 at 466. 
52  Law Commission Review of Joint and Several Liability (NZLC IP32, 2012) at [2.1]. 
53  At [1.2]. 
54  See Stephen Todd "Multiple Tortfeasors and Contribution" in Todd on Torts (8th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2019) 1247 at 1255–1264. 
55  Stephen Todd "Causation and Remoteness of Damage" in Todd on Torts (8th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2019) 1067 at 1068. 
56  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, at [1254]. 
57  Strathboss (CA), above n 8, at [7(e)]. 
58  Todd "Causation and Remoteness of Damage", above n 55, at 1102. 
59  At 1104–1105; and Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd  [1961] AC 388 (PC) 
at 426.  
60  Todd "Causation and Remoteness of Damage", above n 55, at 1110.  
 RETHINKING PROPORTIONALITY IN NEGLIGENCE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 135 
remoteness test would likely not substantially limit MAF's liability. The property damage sustained 
by the orchardists' vines was clearly foreseeable to a reasonable person, following from a failure to 
take reasonable care in granting an import permit for kiwifruit pollen. While Mallon J indicated that 
some of the consequential loss claimed may be too remote,61 the impact this could have on MAF's 
liability is unclear because the extent of the consequential loss claimed has not been determined. 
Mallon J should not have negated MAF's duty of care to achieve proportionality. Indeed, holding 
that MAF did not owe the orchardists a duty of care would have created inverse disproportionality: 
MAF's fault, when weighed against the orchardists' loss, was likely not so minor as to warrant negating 
its duty of care. The point is that Strathboss exposes a lacuna in negligence law's liability limiting 
mechanisms.  
III MECHANISMS FOR LIMITING LIABILITY 
True proportionality is currently unachievable in negligence law in New Zealand. Negligence law 
requires a new "retributive principle".62 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr believed that fault justified shifting 
a loss to a tortfeasor.63 The degree of a tortfeasor's fault should, where necessary and practicable, 
determine how much of a loss shifts. 
A The Wrongful Conception and Birth Cases  
Internationally, a series of cases in negligence against doctors for the wrongful conception or birth 
of children show two potential methods for limiting a tortfeasor's liability to achieve proportionality.64 
First, courts may reduce the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care.65 Secondly, courts may declare a 
particular head of damages unrecoverable, in the interests of policy.66 Lord Wilberforce countenanced 
this latter method in Anns v Merton London Borough Council when creating his two-stage formula 
for determining the existence of a duty of care.67 
  
61  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, at [468]. 
62  Tony Honoré "The Morality of Tort Law–Questions and Answers" in David G Owen (ed) Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 73 at 89. 
63  Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr The Common Law (Paula J S Pereira and Diego M Beltran (eds), University of 
Toronto Law School, Toronto, 2011) at 86. 
64  Stephen Todd "Negligence: Particular Categories of Duty" in Todd on Torts (8th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2019) 273 at 396–397. 
65  At 397. 
66  Craig Purshouse "Judicial reasoning and the concept of damage: Rethinking medical negligence cases" (2015) 
15 Med L Int'l 155 at 160; and Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 
AC 309 at [30]. 
67  Anns, above n 17, at 752. Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) abandoned the Anns two-
stage duty of care formula. 
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The term "wrongful conception" captures situations where a mother conceives following a failed 
sterilisation operation or the provision of negligent advice.68 The phrase "wrongful birth" covers cases 
where a doctor wrongly informs a mother that her unborn child is healthy when the child is disabled 
and situations where a woman is erroneously informed that she is not pregnant.69 In these cases, 
parents have often claimed the costs of raising their child or lost earnings, resulting from having to 
leave work to care for their child. As doctors owe a duty of care in treating their patients and 
upbringing costs or lost earnings are a foreseeable consequence of failing to take reasonable care in 
sterilising or advising a patient, prima facie, these costs are recoverable.70 However, courts have 
generally been unwilling to award upbringing costs or lost earnings, choosing to limit doctors' 
liability, in part because liability for these costs is considered disproportionate to doctors' fault.71 For 
example, in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, a wrongful conception case, the House of Lords held 
that the mother could successfully claim general damages for the harm directly associated with her 
pregnancy and childbirth, but not for upbringing costs.72 
Under the reducing the scope of a duty of care approach, a doctor's duty of care is held to cover 
the costs connected with pregnancy and childbirth, but to exclude upbringing costs and lost earnings.73 
In McFarlane, Lord Slynn held that the doctor's duty of care did not extend to upbringing costs.74 In 
Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust, a wrongful conception case, Lord Steyn in the 
House of Lords labelled the "absence of a duty of care" solution, in respect of upbringing costs, 
"entirely orthodox".75 In Khan v MNX, a wrongful birth case, Nicola Davies LJ in the English Court 
of Appeal held that the scope of the doctor's duty of care did not extend to protecting the mother 
against all the risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth.76 On the facts, there was no "adequate 
link" between the scope of the doctor's duty of care and the child suffering from autism.77 
Under the limited damages approach, judges have drawn a pragmatic line, demarcating damages 
associated with pregnancy and childbirth, which are recoverable, and damages related to a child's 
  
68  Todd "Negligence: Particular Categories of Duty", above n 64, at 396–397. 
69  At 396–397. 
70  At 396–397. 
71  See for example Rees, above n 66; and McFarlane, above n 6. 
72  McFarlane, above n 6. 
73  Rees, above n 66, at [30]. 
74  McFarlane, above n 6, at 76.  
75  Rees, above n 66, at [30]. 
76  Khan v MNX [2018] EWCA Civ 2609, [2019] 4 WLR 3 at [27]. 
77  At [28]. 
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upbringing, which is not a recoverable head of loss.78 In McFarlane, Lord Clyde held that there was 
no "reasonable relationship" between the doctor's fault and the plaintiff's claim for upbringing costs.79 
His Lordship believed that allowing limited damages that excluded these costs provided "the proper 
measure of restitution".80 Lord Hope also tentatively endorsed the limited damages approach, after 
considering a hypothetical example of significant disproportionality where parents claim the costs of 
a child's private education.81  
In the New Zealand context, J v Accident Compensation Corporation, a wrongful conception case, 
involved a claim for lost earnings.82 Cooper and Asher JJ, in a joint judgment in the Court of Appeal, 
considered whether the plaintiff could successfully claim these earnings at common law if the 
statutory bar in s 317(1) of the Accident Compensation Act 2001, which prohibits claims for "damages 
arising directly or indirectly" out of personal injury covered by the Act, did not apply.83 Their Honours 
held that it was unclear whether the plaintiff would succeed in this claim, in part because the potential 
liability for the medical practitioner would be "disproportionate to … the extent of the [practitioner's] 
negligence".84 
The wrongful conception and birth cases are controversial.85 In Parkinson v St James and Seacroft 
University Hospital NHS Trust, a wrongful conception case, Hale J (as she then was) in the English 
Court of Appeal suggested that holding a doctor responsible for the costs of raising a disabled child 
was not a disproportionate outcome.86 However, the rejection of the proportionality argument on the 
facts indicates that Hale J supported the use of proportionality in negligence law, when relevant. 
Nevertheless, in McFarlane, Lord Millett directly disapproved of considering proportionality in 
negligence law, arguing that concerns about disproportionality, which were "commonplace", did not 
justify limiting a tortfeasor's liability.87 Furthermore, in Cattanach v Melchior, a wrongful conception 
case, a majority in the High Court of Australia held that that the parents were entitled to receive the 
  
78  Purshouse, above n 66, at 160. 
79  McFarlane, above n 6, at 106.  
80  At 106.  
81  At 91.  
82  J v Accident Compensation Corporation [2017] NZCA 441, [2017] 3 NZLR 804 at [1]. 
83  At [38]–[39]. 
84  At [39]–[40]. 
85  Purshouse, above n 66, at 157. 
86  Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 530, [2002] QB 266 at 
[95]. 
87  McFarlane, above n 6, at 109. 
138 (2020) 51 VUWLR 
child's upbringing costs.88 Kirby J commented that concerns about disproportionality between a 
doctor's fault and their liability were "unconvincing and unprincipled" and that the need for 
compensation outweighed concerns about disproportionality.89 However, I argue that the interests of 
tortfeasors in being free from unduly onerous burdens should balance the compensatory aim of 
negligence law. 
1 Balancing interests  
Scholars often argue that achieving proportionality in negligence law is inconsistent with its 
compensatory objective.90 "First and foremost, negligence law is a compensator."91 Courts are 
required to put a plaintiff in the monetary position they would have occupied, had the negligence not 
occurred, through an award of compensatory damages.92 If a plaintiff is entitled to compensation 
reflecting their losses, this leaves no space to accommodate what a tortfeasor "deserves to pay".93 In 
fact, through a compensatory lens, imposing liability that reflects a plaintiff's loss can never be 
disproportionate.94  
However, negligence law also aims to prevent placing undue financial burdens on tortfeasors.95 
This is particularly important when a plaintiff's losses will not be distributed among members of 
society because a tortfeasor is not insured.96 Courts must consider the "freedom and security" of a 
tortfeasor in any negligence claim.97 Tortfeasors have "a right to be free … [from] disproportionate 
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also Tame v State of New South Wales [2002] HCA 35, (2002) 211 CLR 317 at [5]; and Honoré, above n 62, 
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96  McFarlane, above n 6, at 82 per Lord Steyn.  
97  Tame v State of New South Wales, above n 95, at [5]. 
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punishment".98 Currently, this principle is articulated in relation to the capacity for proportionality to 
negate a duty of care. This directly infringes the compensatory aim of negligence law. In this article 
it is proposed that the compensatory objective of negligence law operate within more nuanced 
"constraints set by… proportionality".99 A plaintiff's and tortfeasor's interests should be balanced; 
neither should receive absolute priority over the other. 
2 Morality in the wrongful conception and birth cases 
Nevertheless, utilising the reasoning from the wrongful conception and birth cases to create a 
general mechanism for limiting liability to achieve proportionality is at first sight unprincipled. Issues 
of morality cloud the doctrinal legitimacy of these cases: when parents sue for upbringing costs, courts 
are forced to balance the imposition of liability against the birth of a child, which is considered a 
blessing.100 However, proportionality is similarly based on a view of what is morally appropriate.101 
Societal attitudes, reflected in the criminal law, dictate that it is disproportionate to respond to the 
threat of being elbowed with murder.102 This article posits that, were societal attitudes also reflected 
in negligence law, liability would balance a tortfeasor's fault and a plaintiff's loss. A layperson would 
likely regard it as fundamentally unfair that liability in negligence law largely disregards the degree 
of a tortfeasor's fault. The reasoning in the wrongful conception and birth cases shares a common 
grounding with proportionality and can be used to formulate a broader liability limiting mechanism.  
Additionally, while morality is pervasive in the wrongful conception and birth cases, the courts 
have still been mindful of protecting the internal coherence of negligence law.103 The logic of these 
cases is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings, reflected in the internal dynamics, of negligence 
law. The elements of negligence law centre on limiting tortfeasor liability;104 the courts achieve this 
in the wrongful conception and birth cases.  
IV A NEW MECHANISM FOR LIMITING LIABILITY 
This article proposes a nuanced mechanism for limiting a tortfeasor's liability to achieve 
proportionality. The mechanism develops on the reasoning in the wrongful conception and birth cases, 
  
98  Robert J Rhee "A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims" (2004) 36 Ariz 
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101  Letsas, above n 3, at 55. 
102  At 55. 
103  McFarlane, above n 6, at 108 per Lord Millett. 
104  Guido Calabresi and Alvin K Klevorick "Four Tests for Liability in Torts" (1985) 14 J Legal Stud 585. 
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the approach courts take to assessing claims of contributory negligence in New Zealand and the 
Australian system of proportional liability concerning the liability of multiple tortfeasors.  
A Reducing the Scope of a Tortfeasor's Duty of Care  
The differences between limiting a plaintiff's entitlement to damages and reducing the scope of a 
tortfeasor's duty of care are "technical".105 The same outcome is reached, regardless of the approach 
adopted.106 Therefore, it is possible to insert the proposed framework into either mechanism. 
However, in this article it is recommended that courts should be able to limit a tortfeasor's liability for 
damages by reducing the scope of their duty of care. 
There are three reasons for this recommendation. First, the duty inquiry is the "paramount" device 
used in negligence law to control the liability of an alleged tortfeasor: a defendant must owe a plaintiff 
a duty of care in order to be liable for negligence.107 Therefore, it is apt for courts to address the extent 
of a tortfeasor's liability in the duty inquiry. Secondly, courts currently consider proportionality in the 
duty of care analysis. As there is no justification for differing from this position, it should not be 
changed. Lastly, both stages of The Grange framework are capable of hosting proportionality 
disputes. Proportionality, in the context of negligence law, involves a claim that a tortfeasor's fault 
does not justify the imposition of liability for all of a plaintiff's loss. The proximity inquiry, which 
"enables the balancing of the moral claims of both parties",108 is the appropriate forum to address this 
claim. In Strathboss, Mallon J considered proportionality in the policy inquiry, which involves 
considering "judicial conceptions of desirable policy".109 The Court of Appeal did likewise.110 This 
was not inappropriate, as proportionality broadly aims to achieve "fundamental fairness" in society 
by ensuring that losses are evenly shared.111 However, ultimately, assessing what is fair, in the context 
of proportionality, requires recourse to the direct relationship between a tortfeasor's fault and a 
plaintiff's loss. Proportionality is best addressed in the proximity stage.  
1 Demarcating loss  
The mechanisms used by the courts in the wrongful conception and birth cases to limit doctors' 
liability require the existence of two distinguishable heads of loss. In these cases, it is factually 
coherent to separate loss associated with pregnancy and childbirth from upbringing costs or lost 
  
105  Rees, above n 66, at [106] per Lord Millett. 
106  At [30] per Lord Steyn. 
107  Fleming, above n 51, at 150. 
108  Fleming v Securities Commission [1995] 2 NZLR 514 (CA) at 532.  
109  Todd "Negligence: The Duty of Care", above n 18, at 160. 
110  Strathboss (CA), above n 8, at [242].  
111  Rhee, above n 98, at 869.  
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earnings. The two heads of loss, while resulting from the same negligent advice or procedure, are 
distinguishable in kind: one relates to physical discomfort and the other is an economic loss. 
Moreover, the heads of loss are distinguishable in time, as upbringing costs follow childbirth. 
However, in situations where the predominant head of loss claimed is singular in kind and time, it is 
not factually practicable to demarcate this loss into discrete categories. If a Rolls Royce is negligently 
damaged, the property damage sustained is indistinguishable; it is all damage to the car. Therefore, 
the wrongful conception and birth mechanisms cannot be used to limit the liability of a tortfeasor who 
causes a singular kind of loss. MAF's potential liability for property damage, as it cannot be coherently 
factually demarcated, could not be limited under this approach.  
Nevertheless, the consequential loss claimed by the orchardists, being financial in its nature, could 
be factually demarcated from the property damage. However, demarcating the consequential loss 
claimed, and holding that it is not recoverable in the interests of proportionality, would not be 
conceptually coherent. There would be no conceptual justification for excluding the orchardists' claim 
for consequential loss because "there has never been any objection to recovery for economic loss that 
is consequential upon some physical harm".112 Furthermore, MAF's potential direct liability for 
consequential loss is not why MAF's liability may be disproportionate. Instead, the consequential loss, 
combined with the extensive property damage sustained by kiwifruit vines, contributes to potential 
liability which could, in sum, be disproportionate to MAF's fault. In contrast, preventing parents from 
recovering upbringing costs or lost earnings in the wrongful conception and birth cases can generally 
be conceptually justified on the basis that awarding this loss would be directly disproportionate to a 
doctor's fault. There is no "reasonable relationship" between a doctor's fault and liability for 
upbringing costs or lost earnings.113 The wrongful conception and birth cases are unique; ordinarily, 
the availability of a particular head of loss will not be why a tortfeasor's liability is disproportionate 
to their fault.  
2 Levels of disproportionality 
Rees and ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd indicate that the limited damages approach, and 
therefore reducing the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care, may still be too inflexible to create true 
proportionality between a doctor's fault and parents' loss. In Rees, Lord Nicholls found that imposing 
liability for upbringing costs was disproportionate to the doctor's fault.114 His Lordship excluded 
liability for these costs, appearing to favour the limited damages approach.115 However, Lord Nicholls 
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113  McFarlane, above n 6, at 106 per Lord Clyde.  
114  Rees, above n 66, at [16].  
115  At [18]. 
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and the majority added a "gloss" to McFarlane,116 ordering that GBP 15,000 be paid, in addition to 
the pregnancy and childbirth costs, to recognise the wrong done.117 This suggests that an additional 
monetary award was necessary to achieve exact proportionality. Moreover, in ACB, the Singapore 
Court of Appeal, while denying a claim for upbringing costs by utilising the limited damages 
approach, held that the plaintiff had suffered a loss of genetic affinity and assessed the quantum of 
this loss at 30 per cent of the child's upbringing costs.118 This award was thought to be proportionate 
to the tortfeasor's fault.119  
Rees and ACB illustrate that the wrongful birth and conception mechanisms do not accommodate 
for situations where there are differing levels of disproportionality. Directly using these cases to create 
a broad mechanism for limiting liability would draw arbitrary distinctions. If a tortfeasor's liability 
was considered disproportionate, the extent to which their liability could be reduced would depend on 
the categorisation of the plaintiff's loss. And, the categorisation process would not promote 
consideration of the degree of the tortfeasor's fault. For example, suppose that two tortfeasors, in 
different cases, through their negligence cause a significant level of property damage and 
consequential loss. The first tortfeasor causes the harm through "a moment's inadvertence",120 which 
meets the breach threshold, and the second, through more moderate negligence. The liability of both 
could only be reduced to the same extent, despite the second tortfeasor's conduct exhibiting a higher 
degree of fault. The liability imposed on both tortfeasors would be more proportionate to their fault, 
but it would not accurately reflect their degree of fault. The process of demarcating heads of loss is 
unable to accommodate different levels of fault, and therefore, differing levels of disproportionality. 
B Reducing Liability by a Percentage 
A more nuanced approach to reducing the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care is needed. The 
Contributory Negligence Act, and the Australian system of proportional liability in relation to multiple 
tortfeasors,121 provide a solution. They essentially permit courts to allocate a percentage of 
blameworthiness to a tortfeasor, excluding liability for any loss not attributable to this fault. In 
Invercargill City Council, a majority in the Supreme Court fixed the Centre's contributory negligence 
at 50 per cent, which accordingly corresponded with a reduction in the Council's liability by 50 per 
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cent.122 This reinforces the view that negligence law is concerned with "fundamental fairness";123 it 
is not fair for a tortfeasor with minor fault to be liable for extensive losses.  
The Contributory Negligence Act allows courts to reduce a tortfeasor's liability by an "extent as 
the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the 
damage".124 In limiting a tortfeasor's liability, courts measure the contributory negligence of a 
plaintiff at a fixed percentage, therefore, reducing a tortfeasor's liability by that percentage.125 In 
deciding whether to reduce a tortfeasor's liability, courts typically consider the "relative 
blameworthiness" of the plaintiff and tortfeasor and the "causative potency" of their respective acts.126 
Courts assess blameworthiness against the degree to which the actor departs "from the standard of 
conduct exacted by law".127 Fault can range from "trivial inadvertence" through "to the grossest 
recklessness".128  
Under a system of proportionality liability concerning the liability of multiple tortfeasors, a 
tortfeasor is only liable for the percentage of a plaintiff's loss that a court determines is just, after 
considering that tortfeasor's "relative level of fault or comparative responsibility".129 This system, 
which has been widely adopted in Australia,130 protects tortfeasors from the imposition of liability 
that is disproportionate to their fault.131  
However, there are essential differences between the Contributory Negligence Act and a system 
of proportional liability, and using a general liability limiting mechanism in negligence law. 
First, reducing a tortfeasor's liability because of the fault of a plaintiff or another tortfeasor does 
not cut across the compensatory aim of negligence law. A plaintiff does need compensation for loss 
that they have caused, or for loss that will be compensated for by another tortfeasor. In contrast, if a 
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tortfeasor's liability were limited to achieve proportionality, the loss not compensated for by the 
tortfeasor would fall on the plaintiff, who was not at fault. Nevertheless, as discussed, a tortfeasor's 
interests should balance the compensatory aim of negligence law.  
Secondly, in a general framework for limiting a tortfeasor's liability, the focus would solely be on 
the tortfeasor's fault. In contrast, the focus, when considering a claim of contributory negligence, is 
not only on the respective fault and blameworthiness of a tortfeasor and plaintiff. Courts are also 
required to assess causation; the extent to which the plaintiff factually contributed to the harm is 
important. However, Eagle v Chambers demonstrates that fault is the overriding concern in a 
contributory negligence claim.132 In Eagle, the English Court of Appeal held that, while the 
tortfeasor's actions were "much more causatively potent than that of the claimant", the fault of the 
claimant justified a finding of 40 per cent contributory negligence.133 Therefore, Eagle suggests that 
the Contributory Negligence Act's framework for limiting liability, which is based on the equivalent 
legislation in the United Kingdom,134 is capable of being translated into a broader liability limiting 
mechanism, based on the relationship between a tortfeasor's fault and a plaintiff's loss.  
C Reducing the Scope of a Tortfeasor's Duty of Care by a Percentage 
I propose that courts should be free to reduce the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care to "such [an] 
extent as the courts thinks just and equitable",135 after weighing the degree of that tortfeasor's fault 
against the extent of the plaintiff's recoverable loss. Courts should be able to hold that a tortfeasor 
owed a duty of care to avoid only a percentage of the plaintiff's total loss. This method has two 
principal advantages over finding that the scope of a duty of care does not cover a particular head of 
loss. 
First, this approach does not require distinguishable heads of loss, factually or conceptually. A 
tortfeasor's liability for a plaintiff's loss – even if the loss is singular and indistinguishable – can be 
reduced in sum. Secondly, this method is conceptually coherent because it allows differing levels of 
fault; it allows courts to ensure, where necessary, that a tortfeasor's liability is truly proportionate to 
their fault. For instance, under this approach, in the earlier example the inadvertently negligent 
tortfeasor could be liable for 80 per cent of the plaintiff's total loss, and the more blameworthy 
tortfeasor could be liable for 90 per cent of the same total of loss.  
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1 Judicial discretion  
Ultimately, as with contributory negligence claims, courts will not reduce a tortfeasor's liability 
in a "scientific or mathematical way".136 Instead, courts will make a value judgment, based on an 
assessment of the circumstances, on the appropriate balance between a plaintiff's compensatory 
interest and a tortfeasor's right to be free from undue burdens. 
Scholars argue that judges are given too much discretion in determining the appropriate discount 
to a tortfeasor's liability in contributory negligence claims.137 Judges "can take account of whatever 
facts … they feel are important (and ignore facts that they think are unimportant)".138 The same 
criticism could be levelled at this proposal. However, this article does not intend to give absolute 
freedom to judges in limiting a tortfeasor's liability.  
First, judges are always under a duty to produce outcomes that are "roughly consistent with 
outcomes in other factually similar cases".139 This obligation prevents judges from indulging "fancy 
or mere whim",140 and mitigates the danger of inconsistency in outcomes for plaintiffs in negligence 
claims. A body of case law could develop around this proposal, from which judges could make 
comparisons in order to reach consistent and coherent decisions. Secondly, judicial discretion can be 
constrained by guidance.141 This article prescribes the factors courts must consider in assessing 
proportionality: the degree of the tortfeasor's fault and the extent of a plaintiff's loss. Ultimately, the 
benefits gained by enabling courts to reach "nuanced response[s] to the individual circumstances of 
each case" outweigh the detriment associated with judicial discretion.142 If this proposal fettered 
judicial discretion, this would curtail the capacity of courts to accommodate for differing levels of 
disproportionality.143 
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V THE FACTORS: FAULT AND LOSS 
A Proportionality and Indeterminacy  
Before outlining how courts should measure a tortfeasor's fault and a plaintiff's loss, it is necessary 
to disentangle proportionality from the concept of indeterminacy. Proportionality is conceptually 
distinct from concerns about indeterminacy.144 The success of an argument that liability is 
indeterminate depends on whether liability is being imposed on a tortfeasor that is indeterminate (or, 
at least, vast) in amount, class and time, due to the number of individuals affected by a tortfeasor's 
conduct.145 Indeed, the Court of Appeal found that:146 
… the implications of indeterminate liability of the scale in contemplation here are of such significance 
that even the Crown ought not to be cast in the role of indemnifier. 
Indeterminacy also looks to the potential for courts to set burdensome precedents.147 It was suggested 
that Mallon J's judgment did this by opening the floodgates for claims against regulators who make 
operational mistakes.148 Indeterminate liability is unconcerned with the degree of a tortfeasor's fault; 
in contrast, proportionality, in the context of negligence is law, centres on the degree of a tortfeasor's 
fault. 
B Addressing Fault and Loss in a Duty of Care Inquiry 
However, there is a practical problem in assessing a tortfeasor's fault and a plaintiff's loss in the 
proximity inquiry. A duty of care is the gateway to liability in negligence law. Therefore, courts 
generally undertake a duty analysis before considering a tortfeasor's fault and a plaintiff' loss. These 
matters are considered in the breach and remoteness inquiries, respectively. However, this article's 
proposal requires courts to pre-emptively consider these matters in a duty of care analysis, in order to 
decide whether to reduce the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care. As noted by the Court of Appeal, 
analysing proportionality involves "introducing into the [duty] equation the nature and gravity of the 
assumed breach".149  
Nevertheless, Mallon J's judgment and the wrongful conception and birth cases demonstrate that 
courts are capable of moving flexibly and interchangeably through the elements of negligence law; 
Mallon J, when assessing proportionality, considered MAF's fault and the orchardists' loss in her duty 
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of care analysis.150 Therefore, it is not impractical to require courts to address proportionality, and 
thus consider a tortfeasor's fault and a plaintiff's loss, while undertaking a duty of care analysis. 
C The Degree of a Tortfeasor's Fault 
Tort law imposes liability for "socially unreasonable" conduct.151 Socially unreasonable conduct 
has degrees of increasing severity: negligence, recklessness and intentional infliction. Recklessness 
and intentional conduct, which require subjective blameworthiness, have a stigma that does not 
generally exist in relation to negligent conduct.152 In negligence law, an alleged tortfeasor will breach 
their duty of care if their conduct falls below the standard "demanded for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risk of harm", irrespective of their subjective mindset.153 An alleged tortfeasor's 
conduct will fall below this standard if a reasonable person would have acted differently in the 
circumstances.154 
1 Degrees of negligence in law 
Factually, there are indisputably degrees of negligence; in fact, there are "infinite shades", of 
objectively careless conduct.155 Negligence can involve "the slightest inattention" through to "the 
most reprehensible … stupidity".156 However, scholars argue that there are no, and should not be, 
degrees of negligence in law.157 The breach requirement, which requires consideration of a 
tortfeasor's fault, is a "black-and-white concept".158 A tortfeasor has either breached their duty of care, 
and is at fault, or has not, and therefore, is not blameworthy. From this, scholars extrapolate that 
proportionality is irrelevant to negligence law; if there are no degrees of negligence in law, courts are 
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incapable of assessing whether a particular award of damages is disproportionate to a tortfeasor's 
fault.159 
However, the availability of exemplary damages in negligence law, which aim to punish 
tortfeasors who are "guilty of outrageous wrongdoing",160 demonstrates that there are degrees of 
negligence in law.161 A court will only award exemplary damages if it determines that a tortfeasor's 
fault is significant enough to warrant additional punishment. Similarly, the potential for 
proportionality to justify negating a duty of care illustrates that negligence has degrees. MAF's 
argument, which was unsuccessful for different reasons in both the High Court and Court of Appeal, 
was that the degree of its fault, when weighed against the burden of liability, was so minor that it did 
not owe the orchardists a duty of care. Moreover, the doctrine of contributory negligence illustrates 
that negligence has degrees; a plaintiff can only recover damages that are proportionate to the degree 
of fault attributable to the tortfeasor.162 Therefore, the issue is not whether there are degrees of 
negligence in law, but in how to measure those degrees, beyond trusting judicial instincts.163  
2 Measuring a tortfeasor's fault 
Currently, after a breach is established, the extent of a tortfeasor's fault is judged, not by their 
conduct, but primarily by the harm that they caused.164 This unduly favours a plaintiff's compensatory 
interest. While it has been suggested that negligent conduct that is not accompanied by subjective 
blameworthiness is not deserving of "moral censure",165 I argue that the level of a tortfeasor's 
objective carelessness can be used to determine the degree of a tortfeasor's fault. The blameworthiness 
of a tortfeasor who regularly plays with matches by a haystack, eventually causing property damage, 
is obviously greater than the fault of a tortfeasor who causes property damage by inadvertently 
dropping a matchstick.  
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Scholars who accept that there are degrees of negligence in law tend to divide negligence into 
three degrees (see Figure 1).166 Slight negligence consists of the "failure to use great care", ordinary 
negligence involves the "failure to use ordinary care" and gross negligence is "the failure to use even 
slight care".167 Gross negligence, as this article defines it, does not require a subjective component; 
rather, it differs from simple and ordinary negligence in degree.168 A tortfeasor's subjective mindset 
is not relevant to measuring the degree of the fault.169 
Figure 1.170 
I propose that courts should measure the degree of a tortfeasor's fault by placing their conduct on 
a scale between slight negligence (which meets the breach threshold) through to gross negligence. 
The more advanced a tortfeasor's negligence is, the more blameworthy that tortfeasor is,171 and the 
less likely it is that the mechanism proposed in this article will be engaged. Indeed, if a court 
determines that a tortfeasor's conduct leans towards gross negligence, that court should be prohibited 
from limiting that tortfeasor's liability, as to do so would not achieve proportionality. This article only 
  
166  See Elliott, above n 155, at 95 for Figure 1. 
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aims to allow courts to produce fairer outcomes for tortfeasors who cause significant loss through 
mid-to-low-level negligence.  
However, articulating negligence into three degrees is of limited utility; it "merely … break[s] up 
one broad generality into three".172 Therefore, this article proposes that a series of tiered factors should 
be used to determine where on the negligence scale a tortfeasor's conduct falls.173 I outline, without 
intending to be exhaustive, certain factors that courts should consider. The weight and balance given 
to these factors will depend on a court's view of the relevant evidence. This will enable courts to adjust 
to the varied circumstances that arise in negligence claims.174 
The sole tier-one factor proposed is the degree of risk involved in the negligent act or omission.175 
This requires courts to objectively consider, in the tortfeasor's shoes, how likely the conduct was to 
cause harm and the magnitude of harm that could have been foreseen.176 This inquiry should be made 
in "in light of the overall activity setting", because certain activities, such as playing with matches by 
a haystack, inherently carry a high likelihood for significant harm to occur.177 This factor should bear 
the most "probative weight";178 conduct that was unlikely to cause harm, especially significant harm, 
should be placed towards the lower end of the negligence scale. 
Two tier-two factors are proposed. The first is whether the tortfeasor was performing a public 
function. If the tortfeasor was protecting the public and the public was reliant on the tortfeasor for that 
protection, this indicates that the tortfeasor is blameworthy. However, a subset of this factor is whether 
an award of damages would ultimately be "borne by the public through taxes".179 If the New Zealand 
public is to be "the insurer or guarantor of losses",180 this should be a strong countervailing 
consideration.  
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177  LeCesne, above n 171, at 151. 
178  At 153.  
179  Strathboss (HC), above n 7, at [478]. 
180  At [478]. 
 RETHINKING PROPORTIONALITY IN NEGLIGENCE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 151 
The next tier-two factor is whether the tortfeasor's conduct was consistent with past practice.181 
For example, repeated "tolerance for safety lapses" involves a high degree of blameworthiness.182 In 
contrast, if a tortfeasor's negligence was an isolated event, this indicates a lower level of fault. The 
last factor proposed is whether there are any "exigent circumstances".183 This factor is intended to 
operate as a "justification mechanism", allowing tortfeasors to explain whether any extraneous 
circumstances compelled them to act as they did.184 If this is the case, a tortfeasor may be less 
blameworthy than it appeared at first instance.  
D The Extent of a Plaintiff's Loss  
A tortfeasor can cause significant loss in two ways: an individual may suffer extensive loss, or 
numerous individuals may suffer smaller losses that cumulatively total significant loss. This article 
addresses both scenarios, assuming that, if multiple individuals suffer small losses, an action is taken 
collectively under r 4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016, as in Strathboss.185  
The extent of a plaintiff's loss in a negligence claim is a question of fact, depending on evidence 
and proof. In general, it will be easier for courts to establish the extent of a plaintiff's loss than the 
tortfeasor's degree of fault. 
The filters of causation and remoteness can limit a plaintiff's damages.186 Moreover, certain heads 
of loss are unrecoverable in negligence law, such as relational economic loss.187 Therefore, when 
comparing a plaintiff's loss with a tortfeasor's fault, courts should only weigh the loss that is 
recoverable. Unrecoverable loss has no bearing on whether a tortfeasor's liability is disproportionate.  
This article aims to constrain the compensatory objective of negligence law. Courts should not 
consider non-compensatory damages when measuring a plaintiff's loss. Courts should also consider a 
plaintiff's recoverable loss in sum, even if there are multiple heads of recoverable loss. For example, 
if the proposed mechanism were to be used in a stage two hearing in Strathboss, the extent of 
recoverable property damage and consequential loss would be considered cumulatively. This is 
because the recoverability of a particular head of loss will not generally be why a tortfeasor's liability 
is disproportionate to their fault. Moreover, while the recoverability of certain heads of loss are more 
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controversial than others,188 all recoverable loss should be treated equally when assessing a 
proportionality claim. This is because, once a head of loss is deemed to be recoverable, it has the same 
effect on the proportionality between a tortfeasor's fault and their liability as a less controversial head 
of loss, such as property damage. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Negligence law in New Zealand does not reflect "fundamental fairness",189 as, to borrow from 
the language of the criminal law, the punishment does not fit the crime.190 Moral luck determines 
whether "inattention or slowness to react" results in crushing legal liability or no liability at all.191 
The extent of a tortfeasor's liability, with the exceptions of contributory negligence and exemplary 
damages, is determined without considering the degree of their fault.192  
The prompt for this article was Mallon J's unclear analysis in Strathboss of MAF's claim that 
imposing liability for the Psa3 incursion was disproportionate to its fault. However, the critical issue 
is with the inflexible framework which case law dictated Mallon J, and the Court of Appeal, use. 
Courts in New Zealand have historically only used the concept of proportionality in negligence law 
as a factor contributing to the negation of a duty of care. As Strathboss illustrates, this approach is 
flawed because, by not allowing a tortfeasor's liability to be limited, it cannot achieve true 
proportionality. Moreover, negligence law's liability limiting mechanisms will not always operate to 
ensure there is proportionality between a tortfeasor's fault and a plaintiff's loss.  
Proportionality, in the context of negligence law, requires that the liability imposed on a tortfeasor 
be fair both to the harmed party in terms of compensation, and to that tortfeasor. Negligence law 
should not unduly burden tortfeasors.193 Internationally, courts in the wrongful conception and birth 
cases have struck this balance in allowing parents to claim for loss associated with pregnancy and 
childbirth, but not for upbringing costs or lost earnings. However, the liability limiting mechanisms 
used by the courts in these cases are fact-specific. This article develops on these cases, proposing that 
courts should be able to reduce the scope of a tortfeasor's duty of care to "such [an] extent as the court 
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thinks just and equitable".194 In deciding whether this is necessary, courts must first consider the 
degree of a tortfeasor's fault and then weigh this fault against the plaintiff's recoverable loss. 
Ultimately, considering issues of proportionality in a more nuanced framework will ensure that the 
law of negligence delivers just results. 
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